Sept 00 Transport
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Sept 00 Transport
Traffic Concerns

The draft Community Transport Management  Plan dated September 2000 was exhibited at the beginning of December. 

There was no community group or representative involved in the preparation of the draft.

This is the Rhodes Peninsula Group's comments on the draft Transport Management Plan. It was annexed to the Letter of 29 January, 2001to DUAP in response to the exhibition of draft Community Development, Transport Management and Development Control Plans over the Christmas Holiday Period 2000-2001. DUAP declined the request of the Council of the City of Canada Bay for an extension to 1 March (and allowed only 1 week to 8 February).

Page numbers are from the draft Transport Management Plan

Page 9 - Influence of Western Sydney Orbital  
Page 11 - Table 4.3 - No Support for Modal Choice Targ ets
 
Pages 11 to 13 - Current Train Loading Data Required
 
Page 16 - Ryde Bridge Traffic Flows 
Page 17 - Currently Badly Congested Roads 
Page 18 - Modal Choice Doubts
Page 19 - Table 5.1 - No support for Shopper Numbers 
Page 19 - No Support for Sufficient Rail Capacity Claim 
Page 21 - 3 Second Gap 
Page 24 - Buses Modal Choice 
Page 24 - Demand Management - Need for Improved Train Performance 
Page 26 - Overflow Parking Strategy 
Page 28 - Private Ferry Service Unlikely 
Page 29 - Totally Inadequate Infrastructure Works 
Figures 9 and 10 - Inconsistent Flows 
Appendix A - Overflow Parking Policy Required 
Appendix B - Discrepancies and No Explanations of Claims 
Appendix C - No Reference to 1990 Worker Survey/Overcrowded Trains/Intentional Road Congestion 
Appendix D - Discrepancies and Lack of Information 
Appendix 1 - NETANAL Plots Discrepancies and Doubts 
Appendix 2 - Questions on Intersection Improvements 
Appendix 3 - Traffic Flow Discrepancies
Appendix 4 - SCATES Results - Discrepancies and Further Information Required 

Rhodes Peninsula Group

Detailed Comments on September 2000 Draft Transport Management Plan

Page 9 - Influence of Western Sydney Orbital

“Future Influences” includes the statement “continued growth in arterial traffic flows (which could be influenced to some extent if/when the Sydney Western Orbital (sic) route is constructed)”. The report is deficient in not mentioning whether the future traffic flows provided later in the report are influenced by the Western Sydney Orbital (WSO), if built. The impact of the WSO in reducing traffic flows was mentioned in the DUAP report to the Minister on the draft REP public comments. Whilst there may be some lateral flow-on effects, it is difficult to see how a road which does not come within 20 kms of Ryde Bridge and which has 5 or 6 significant intervening parallel routes will have any impact on Ryde Bridge traffic flows. ACTION DUAP: Please advise whether the WSO has been allowed for in estimating the future traffic flows, If so, to what extent it impacts on flows and please provide the supporting origin/destination survey information on which this estimate is made (i.e. the proportion of drivers who travel from Liverpool to Hornsby via Ryde Bridge).

Page 11 - Table 4.3 - No Support for Modal Choice Targ ets

It seems that the modal choice targets from the Dec 1998 study have been adopted. In the June 1991 “Rhodes Peninsula Traffic and Transport Study” by TEC, a survey was carried out of the transport habits of around 1,600 employees working at Rhodes. The adopted targets are completely at odds with the results of this survey. Surely this survey provides the best indication of the likely transport mode for local workers associated with the new development, especially as it included the then 605 Digital employees. Yet this survey is ignored in this study.

In summary this survey showed that to get to work:

·         Of the 574 workers west of the railway line,    70.0% used car    and    26.7% used train.

·         Of the 1043 workers east of the railway line,    87.1% used car    and    10.4% used train.

However, the east side (which included Leeds St plus Digital) had a much lower percentage of blue collar workers (12.6% vs 49.1%) which could explain the reduction in train and increase in car usage for these workers. If this is correct, the new development which will have few, if any, blue collar workers, hence could have an even higher car percentage and lower train percentage.

Although contemporary employee parking policies may have influenced this to some extent, nevertheless such survey figures put serious doubt on the ability for the target modal choice to be met.

Also the survey showed that of the 1617 workers, only 2.8% lived in the Concord area (much less Rhodes). Hence the assumption that 10% of workers will walk or cycle to work (Page 11) is very questionable. Other reasons this assumption is questioned are:

·         the increasing lack of job security would see few workers relocating to very expensive housing just to be convenient to their place of work,

·         the anticipated high cost of these residences will very likely restrict the socio-economic demographic of the residents and hence the opportunity to accommodate the majority of workers in the commercial/retail sector, and

·         due to the necessary remediation, there is likely to be a significant lag (6 years or so) between the southern site (retail/commercial) and the northern site (the bulk of the residential). Hence there may be a reduced pool of local residents available to supply the initial workforce.

It is essential that the Plan includes the results of this survey and fully verifies, with detailed supporting evidence, any significant deviation when estimating transport modal targets.

Pages 11 to 13 - Current Train Loading Data Required

Although train load figures may be conveniently available for Burwood, this section needs to provide a clear indication of the current loading at Rhodes Station, not just for the trains stopping there but for the express trains which now pass through Rhodes.

Section 5 should include an assessment of the available capacity which can be obtained at Rhodes by extra carriages and extra services, along with the calculated future patronage attributable to this development, Digital and other significant developments on the Main Northern Line. Please see our additional comments/questions under Page 19 heading.

Page 16 - Ryde Bridge Traffic Flows

The entire analysis of traffic flows in this study are based on 1998 traffic flows and the increases over those flows due to the development and base traffic flow. The Ryde Bridge traffic flows given in Table 4.5 show that the observed maximum one-way hourly flow in 1998 was 3873 veh/hr and the 2000 observed maximum flow was 4333 veh/hr. This 4333 veh/hr is larger than any of the modelled Ryde Bridge flows after the development (see the 2006 NETANAL flows).

To suggest that the flow increases due to the development will result in less Ryde Bridge traffic than currently occurs, puts serious doubts over the whole study results.

Page 17 - Currently Badly Congested Roads

The statement that traffic can queue from the Blaxland Rd/Devlin St intersection back through Rhodes supports our claim to how prone this area currently is to traffic congestion.

Page 18 - Modal Choice Doubts

The demand assumptions suggest that 20% of retail vehicle trips and 10% of showroom vehicle trips will be internal. A further 20% seem to walk or cycle, which will be mainly people in the development with a small contribution likely from Liberty Grove and nearby streets. There are no calculations provided to show what this means in terms of the number of shoppers who live in the development. ACTION DUAP: Please provide data on the percentage of residents shopping at any one time.

Page 19 - Table 5.1 - No support for Shopper Numbers

Table 5.1 gives the estimated transport demand for the site and the Digital augmentation. The PM peak person trips per hour (7,120) are 1.82 times that of the AM peak person trips/hour (3,920). However, the PM vehicle trips per hour (2,110) are only 1.28 times that of the PM vehicle trips/hour (1,650) despite some 3,200 shopper trips per hour only in the PM figures. Unfortunately there are no calculations provided to show how these figures have been derived but presumably the difference is the shoppers of which only a small proportion appear to be external but not passing trade. Our quick calculations suggest that only 18% of the people shopping at any time have specifically driven there from outside the development. ACTION DUAP: Please provide the calculations which support these figures and confirm the percentage of specific external shoppers. Also please advise how the 3,200 shopper trips was derived as this seems significantly less than average hourly figures (not peak) for other shopping centres.

Page 19 - No Support for Sufficient Rail Capacity Claim

There is absolutely no supporting evidence for the statement that the provision of all 8 car trains and more frequent services “would supply more than sufficient capacity” to meet the expected increase in rail demand.

With reference to Table 4.4, those new residents wishing to catch the 7:54, 8:09, 8:27 or 8:38 train will find it difficult to get a seat as these trains are already (even if 8 cars) on average loaded to over 100% of seating capacity. Additional capacity may be available in the express trains not currently stopping at Rhodes. However, it is likely these trains are, during this peak period, already overloaded but no figures are provided.

It is appreciated that the load figures provided are for Burwood and that additional capacity may be available after the Parramatta/Chatswood line begins. Also workers alighting at Rhodes may provide space for workers but this may still have massive impacts for adjacent stations e.g. West Ryde, Meadowbank, Concord West and North Strathfield residents which may service the Newington, Mariners Cove, Millennium Waters etc developments

Regardless, there is totally insufficient information provided in this report to support any claim that trains will be able to carry the additional load. If 24% of the 2,420 person trips/hour are by train and if 80% of these (say) are city bound then the additional passengers looking for seats on the above four trains is 0.24*0.8*2,420 = 465 passengers which brings the load on each of these trains to 115% yet there is not even a word about the load from other developments proposed along the Main Northern Line.

ACTION DUAP: Please provide the following to support the claim in the report:

·         current train loadings at Rhodes station, both stopping and non-stopping

·         estimates of increased patronage due to this development

·         City Rail confirmation that the capacity of the system can cope with this development plus all others proposed which will utilise this line, including the likely impact of the Parramatta/Chatswood line

·         the impact on services at other stations, especially those which may lose express services.

Without such knowledge the statement “more than sufficient capacity” is available is totally unsupported and greatly affects the desired modal split. The provision of a new station building is totally irrelevant if people have to watch overcrowded trains pass through the station.

Page 21 - 3 Second Gap

The study refutes the claim that a 3 second gap should be maintained between vehicles and hence the 1,200 vehicles per hour per lane does not need to be a design restraint. We accept that design handbooks refer to much higher flow rates but the fact remains that the RTA recommends “you should leave a gap of 3 seconds between your vehicle and the one you are following”. It is understood this is also displayed on electronic signs on some roads.

RTA accident records for the road south of Ryde Bridge show that in 1988-89, one third of the accidents and one half of the injuries on this section of road were due to rear end collisions. To adopt a design flow of more than 1,200 veh/lane/hr, and ignore this safety issue, could be considered unethical, and possibly negligent, design unless the handbook is altered accordingly.

Please note that the RTA has advised that the design capacity for the bridge is considered to be a total of 5,900 vehicles/hr for the whole bridge. The SCATES analysis suggests that the peak flow over Ryde Bridge due to the existing conditions plus this development is around 7,900 veh/hr or 2.7 secs between cars so it fails RTA requirements on two accounts.

RPG will also be raising these matters with the RTA separately.

Page 24 - Buses Modal Choice

Tables 4.1 and 4.3 show that the largest percentage increase in modal split to work will need to be buses increasing from an existing 3.2% for Concord LGA to 10% for the Rhodes site. In fact, it is likely that the percentage of bus use by existing Rhodes residents is even much lower as the 3.2% figure would reflect more the use of buses to areas away from the railway line, such as Cabarita, Mortlake etc. Page 13 of the report supports this with STA indicating that buses are not heavily patronised. Also the Nov 1990 Rhodes workers survey says that only 1.6% caught a bus to work.

Hence to achieve the 10% target, bus patronage will need to increase around 6 to 7 fold. However, this report predicts massive traffic congestion on the surrounding roads before this development is completed. This will no doubt impact greatly on the viability of bus transport and therefore put serious doubt on reaching this modal split.

Page 24 - Demand Management - Need for Improved Train Performance

The report is correct in stating that this development has an opportunity to influence people’s transport decision making processes before habits have been formed. Hence it is absolutely essential that the train system be upgraded prior to their first trip as one journey on a hot, packed train (as currently happens too frequently) will quickly influence their transport choice. To have any chance of the train modal target being met, the development cannot begin until it can be proven that the system can, and will be, sufficiently upgraded. To date, such proof is totally lacking.

Page 26 - Overflow Parking Strategy

The need to restrict parking in the development in order to attempt to reduce car usage will no doubt result in excessive overflow parking in surrounding streets unless mechanisms are put in place to restrict this. This has clearly been demonstrated by the massive increase in on-street parking as a result of the existing Digital and retail development. ACTION DUAP: What is being planned to handle the overflow parking?

Perhaps car usage can be restricted by charging residents to enter and leave the site, via electronic tolling, with the proceeds going to contribute to the road improvements that will be needed. This would have a double benefit.

Page 28 - Private Ferry Service Unlikely

It is stated that an opportunity may exist for a private ferry service to the site. Yet Page 14 indicates that Sydney Ferries consider the ferry service a loss making venture and not worthy of expansion. Accordingly, is it reasonable to expect that a private service could be established?

Page 29 - Totally Inadequate Infrastructure Works

The Scates analysis clearly demonstrates that the road system surrounding this proposed development is totally incapable of accommodating the traffic flows associated with this development, even with the works proposed in this study, particularly when considered as part of a plan to over-develop surrounding areas. This section of the report suggests that additional works will need to be considered as development proceeds. However, it is blatantly clear that this development will have a huge impact on the traffic in this area. Accordingly, it should be contributing significantly to the cost of works to alleviate this situation. It is inappropriate that such contribution begins part way through the development. Hence a serious investigation into the works required as a result of this and the other developments in the nearby area should have been completed prior to approval of any of these developments.

At a meeting with the Shadow Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning and RPG representatives, Dr Dearing of DUAP advised that an estimated $7 million worth of roadworks would be necessary. It would appear that the significant portion of this cost is to cover the minimum cost of access into the site and has little to do with improving local traffic flows. ACTION DUAP: Could you please provide an estimate of how the $7 million is split between the various works.

If not fully funded by the developer, the identified works will also need to be incorporated into the future Sydney road plans and budgeted for at this stage. It is clear that, as an absolute minimum, grade-separations will need to be provided at the Homebush Bay Drive/Concord Rd and Concord Rd/Averill St intersections, and/or that a further crossing of the Parramatta River is required. ACTION DUAP: Please provide confirmation that the RTA is satisfied that the proposed works are sufficient to accommodate this development and that there will be no need for additional State-funded works.

Using the Scates analysis results it appears that the traffic increases associated with this development and Digital is the equivalent of around 10 to 15 years of normal regional traffic growth at the rate estimated in this study. ACTION DUAP: Please have MWT calculate this and incorporate the finding in the Plan.

Figures 9 and 10 - Inconsistent Flows

Although not shown in the figures, Page 14 states they are peak hourly traffic flows for 1998. This should be added to the Figures.

In Figure 9, the northbound flow in Homebush Bay Drive south of Oulton Ave is 2890. With 12 further cars entering at Oulton Ave the flow approaching the Concord Rd intersection should be about 2902 but the Concord Rd intersection detail plan shows 2700. ACTION DUAP: Which is correct?

In Figure 10, the northbound flow just north of Mary St is 3435 (3365+66+4). However the flow approaching the next intersection at Llewellyn St is 3745 (3671+64+10). Why is there a 9% difference in this flow?

Appendix A - Overflow Parking Policy Required

The introduction states “However as roads within areas to the east of the railway are currently without significant on-street parking controls there needs to be a balance found between restriction of development car parking and potential overparking of surrounding on-street areas.” This is already clearly evident in the incidence of on-street parking in Blaxland Rd presumably associated with the relatively recent Digital and retail developments. The 1990 Rhodes worker survey mentioned in our Page 11 comments should be redone for the Digital site to see how much parking restrictions have influenced transport modal choice since that survey. The threat of massive on-street overflow parking in surrounding streets due to the proposed parking restrictions is huge and must be controlled.

Should the strategy to provide an efficient public transport system and bus interchange at Rhodes be successful, thereby attracting commuters from surrounding areas, there is likely to be the need for a large commuter parking facility yet none seems to be proposed.

The suggestion that a retail parking charge be introduced (after two hours say) will probably see the limited visitor parking spaces in the development being used for this and commercial employee purposes unless restricted.

Appendix B - Discrepancies and No Explanations of Claims

On Page B-1 it is stated that with a 55% car modal share, the commercial vehicle trip generation will be 1.3 vehicles/100m2 GFA. However, Page A-1 calculates the use of cars for commercial purposes as 1.78 vehicles/100m2 i.e. 37% higher. ACTION DUAP: Why is there a discrepancy and which value has been used in the overall traffic flow assessments?

In the table on Page B-1, the 55% figures differ greatly from those shown in Table 5.1. Presumably the difference comes from the application of internal, passing, dual purpose journeys etc, but throughout the report there is not one definite table with supporting calculations which enable this to be verified. The table also clearly indicates the sensitivity to the modal target of 55%. Given that the 1990 survey suggests that possibly in excess of 90% of Rhodes workers drive to work, a contingency plan covering the situation, if the target is not met, is vital and yet there is none given.

Under the table it is stated that the AM trips have been added to the NETANAL figures however, there is no mention of the PM figures.

The VKT graph seems to be pulled out of thin air and makes unsupportable claims. It cannot be seen how the 55% target reduces the VKT by 5,000 vehicle kms nor can it be seen from what it reduces.

The closing paragraph on Page B-2 re the shorter average trip length is irrelevant if travel times and fuel consumption are greater due to the increased congestion near Rhodes. Additional vehicle sourced pollution will be worse and concentrated in locations close to high-density development.

Appendix C - No Reference to 1990 Worker Survey/Overcrowded Trains/Intentional Road Congestion

Page C-1 refers to the 1996 Census and the 1991 Home Interview Travel Survey the data in which forms the basis of Appendix C. However, there is no mention of the comprehensive 1990 Rhodes workers survey (see Page 11 comment), from which one can infer that around 90% of the then employees of the Digital site drove to work. Surely this is some of the most applicable data available for this site and cannot be ignored without an updated survey.

Page C-13 lists the main factors influencing a person’s choice to catch a train to work. It is surprising that overcrowding of trains does not rate a mention. We are aware that this is a common complaint amongst ourselves and friends/colleagues who catch trains. Once you have to stand, especially in crowded conditions, it generally prohibits reading, working or sleeping on the train; all common uses of the travel time.

Throughout the Annexure to Appendix C there is a suggestion that public transport usage can be increased by increasing congestion on the roads. ACTION DUAP: Is this a Government policy?

Appendix D - Discrepancies and Lack of Information

Page D-4 lists the expected increases in households and jobs within the Concord area. ACTION DUAP: How have these increases been included in assessing the increased traffic on the Rhodes road system? The figures seem to ignore the other developments outside Concord, including (but not limited to) Newington (approx 1200 more residences to be occupied), Broadoak Waters (700 residences), Millennium Waters (1,800 residences) and the recently announced Olympic site. It would seem necessary that these developments, which are concentrated in the area, be considered separately from the overall regional road increases. It is considered that these developments would have a significant impact on traffic flows, infinitely more than the reduction due to the Western Sydney Orbital.

On Page D-4 the significance of providing 2006 NETANAL results does not appear to be explained. ACTION DUAP: Presumably the 2016 figure represent full development but could you please explain the significance of 2006 (which also appears to represent full development) and what background traffic growth is associated with both 2006 and 2016? The NETANAL has three cases 1998, 2006, & 2016 but the SCATES has five runs. Also please advise how they are related i.e. which NETANAL flows are used for which SCATES runs.

Page D-5 states that the SCATES model used the proposed intersection layouts plus additional improvements to signal operations. However, there is no mention of what signal operations are adopted for the modelling. Although subsequent changes can be made, alterations of signal phasing are of great interest to the local community and should be included. ACTION DUAP: Please advise of the light timing assumptions.

Table D.8 contains several questionable entries. The most significant is why does the Alfred St intersection have a better performance in Run 5 (full development + 18 years base traffic flow growth) than both Runs 3 and 4, where Run 3 represents full development with no base traffic flow growth. In fact, the SCATES print out in Appendix 4 shows the flow through this intersection increases by around 19% from Run 3 to 5, but the delay appears to drop from 62 to 49 secs. ACTION DUAP: Please explain this discrepancy.

On Page D-8, Table D.11 means little without:

·         an explanation of what each category means (e.g. are the retail employees included in commercial or retail/showroom). Table 5.1 includes separately commercial, retail/showroom workers, and shoppers with there being no shopper traffic assumed in the AM. Table D.11 does not have a separate shopper category for AM (or PM) yet the retail/showroom has equal numbers entering and leaving in both AM and PM when Table 5.1 indicates no shopper traffic.

·         the assumptions used which may or may not be the same as those given for the previous study on Page 18

·         calculations of how person trips are determined and how vehicle trips are derived from the person trips.

Without a good explanation of these most important figures the usefulness of this document is greatly diminished. ACTION DUAP: Please provide the above information.

Page D-8 mentions that future Sydney road network improvements will affect local traffic flows yet fails to list what these are and clearly express whether they have been included in the results given. ACTION DUAP: Please advise what improvements are assumed.

Table D.16, a repeat of Table D.8, shows the Level of Service for each intersection but fails to show the assumed light phasing, the delay associated with each level of service, the degree of saturation of each intersection etc. The SCATES results in Table D.11 provides average delay figures. ACTION DUAP: Are these average for the worst peak hour flows or average for a three hour period (say)? Does the SCATES also provide maximum, not average, delays?

The SCATES results in Appendix 4 show that delays up to 583 secs can be expected at the location currently experiencing 196 secs, despite the improvements, yet both are rated the maximum F level of service. These delays must be inserted in the main report in Table 5.2 along with the degree of saturation ratings, which are horrendous in some cases. ACTION DUAP:  Why haven’t the degrees of saturation and average delays been provided for the five runs in Table D.16?

The SCATES analysis does not mention the Homebush Bay Drive/Oulton Road intersection at all possibly as there appears to be no lights proposed. There does not appear to be a mention of whether this intersection will have lights for the right turn into Oulton Avenue and what impact this has on the SCATES analysis which ignores this intersection. There is no figure showing the number of vehicles turning right here into Oulton Ave nor any figure which allows this to be calculated. In fact, using the Ryde Bridge/Concord Rd/Homebush Bay Drive (HBD) splits shown on Page 20, it appears the 2016 AM NETANAL plots are grossly in error. The southbound flow along HBD just south of the Concord Rd intersection appears to show that Oulton Ave must add 635 vehicles to provide the indicated increase in HBD flows (i.e. 2655 to 3290). Hence, even if there are no vehicles turning right into Oulton Ave, there will need to be 635 vehicles turning right out of Oulton Ave using the slip road into (HBD). These 635 vehicles represent 78% of all the AM outflows from the site, yet the Page 20 flow distributions show around only 33% will be going down HBD. If any cars turn right into Oulton Ave from HBD, even more cars need to turn right to maintain continuity of flow in HBD. It is not clear whether these NETANAL flows have been used in the SCATES analysis but if so, this apparent over-estimate of HBD flows could cause a significant error.  ACTION DUAP: Please explain whether our assessment of this situation is correct, whether the NETANAL intersection flows, as shown, are correct, and whether these flows have been used in the SCATES analysis?

Appendix 1 - NETANAL Plots Discrepancies and Doubts

ACTION DUAP: Has there been any allowance for flows in the Homebush Bay/Oulton Road intersection for traffic either entering or leaving Liberty Grove? We can think of reasons for including or excluding these flows but what has been assumed by MWT.

There are many dubious flows in the plots. Some of these are:

1998 AM: The south bound flow in Concord Rd just south of Homebush Bay Drive is more than that for both 2006 and 2016. However, there does appear to be a significant increase in southbound traffic in Homebush Bay Drive. In fact, between 1998 and 2006 there is a 59% increase in flow here. Similarly there is only a 3% increase in southbound flow over Ryde Bridge between 2006 and 2016. Yet the assumption on Page 20 is that 50% or 40% of the traffic entering/leaving the area (depending on whether residential or other) does so from/to the north. ACTION DUAP: What assumptions have been made and what support is there?

1998 AM and PM: The flows over Ryde Bridge are significantly different than the maximums given in Table 4.5 on Page 16. ACTION DUAP: Is this because the north and southbound flow maximums occur at different times?

2016 AM: Table D.11 shows that 133 residential vehicles leave the southern site and 499 leave the northern site each hour i.e. a total of 632 vehicles. Page 20 assumes 50% of residential trips go north i.e. a total of 316 vehicles. With almost 80% living in the northern sector, it would be reasonable to assume that at least 80% of these 316 vehicles (i.e. 253) would leave Averill St and travel north over Ryde Bridge. However, the plot shows only 117 leaving Averill St of which some proportion may go south. ACTION DUAP: Please explain this; why is there a 64% increase in flows southbound along Homebush Bay Drive over those in 1998, and why is the city bound flow in Victoria Rd (2343) less than for 1998 (2502)?

2016 PM:  The northern sector is predominantly residential and hence it would be reasonable to expect minimal out-going flow in the PM from the northern area. Presumably shopping/commercial traffic will be discouraged from leaving via Averill St which would require driving through the residential area. ACTION DUAP: Hence why is there almost 4 times as many cars leaving Averill St (499) than in the morning? The SCATES results (discussed later) show that these PM vehicles are subjected to absolutely ridiculous delays.

Appendix 2 - Questions on Intersection Improvements

ACTION DUAP: Will the additional right turn lane southbound in Concord Rd at Averill St require property acquisition?

Will the Homebush Bay Drive/Oulton Ave intersection have light control? If yes, why hasn’t this intersection been included in the SCATES analysis? If no, how many veh/hr are assumed to be turning right from Concord Rd into the site against two lanes of traffic flowing at 3208 veh/hr (i.e. only 2.25 secs apart)? Liberty Grove residents in the high rise near this intersection would be tempted to turn right here adding to the traffic flows. Accordingly are the right turn lanes long enough to store the right turning traffic? Is it possible that lights will be required soon after occupation occurs thereby impacting on the SCATES analysis? Why is no slip road planned for these cars as a permanent solution? ACTION DUAP: Please provide answers to the above questions.

Appendix 3 - Traffic Flow Discrepancies

All plans confusingly label the leftmost intersection as Homebush Bay Drive (HBD). This suggests the main “straight” through road is Concord Rd where it is actually HBD with the side street being Concord Rd South.

ACTION DUAP: For the Llewellyn St intersection (AM), why does the northbound Concord Rd through flow drop as a result of the development and base growth (1998: 3357, 1998 + devel: 3085, 2016: 3195)?

ACTION DUAP: For the Mary St intersection (PM), why does the northbound Concord Rd through flow drop massively (over 17%) as a result of base traffic growth (1998 + devel: 3823, 2016: 3160)?

It is possible (probably quite likely) that other anomalies exist but an answer to these will suffice at this stage.

Appendix 4 - SCATES Results - Discrepancies and Further Information Required

The major findings of this appendix must be included in the main body of the report i.e. Section 5. There are very significant findings here that the community has a right to know without having to wade through complicated, unexplained computer output.

The brief explanation at the start of each sheet, does not make it clear whether the delays etc consider the interaction between intersections. ACTION DUAP: Could you please elaborate?

No Degree of Saturation (DS) figures have been given in the main body of the report. Other traffic studies indicate that an intersection is satisfactory at a DS of 0.7 but queues and delays increase rapidly as DS approaches 1. By 2016, the study shows the PM DS for the Averill St intersection will be 3.84.

Other concerns include:

·         In Runs 3 and 5 the average PM delays in Concord Rd at Averill St are slightly greater than those in Averill St. ACTION DUAP: Could you please confirm that this means priority, by light timing, is being given to Averill St traffic. If so, on what basis is this assumption made?

·         In Run 5 the average PM delays for this Averill St intersection are almost certainly incorrect, i.e. the delay in Concord Rd is 0 secs and that in Averill St is 10165 secs. This is totally different to those mentioned above which are around 50 to 80 secs for both roads. ACTION DUAP: Please confirm this is an error or explain the results.

Due to the reduction in development size, the increased flows due to the development + Digital is about 60% of that adopted in the Arup study. The difference in flows at the northern boundary of the MWT SCATES model between {1998} and {1998 + development + Digital} results should give the approximate increase in traffic flows over Ryde Bridge due to the development + Digital. However when these are compared with the increases given in the Arup report for AM and PM, northbound and southbound, it seems they range from 14% to 40% of the Arup Ryde Bridge increases, not 60%. ACTION DUAP: Please explain this very significant difference.

To provide a better indication of the impact on the road system, the report must include the increase in overall travel time through this section of road and the anticipated queue lengths.

From the SCATES analysis flows, if you subtract the Case 3 flows from the Case 5 flows you get an indication of the background growth, which averages out about 22%. Applying this increase to the 2000 AADT you get an estimated AADT for 2016 of around 87,000. With other AADT figures obtained from other reports etc, a plot of AADT vs year can be obtained (see below).

Also plotted is a reasonable extrapolation of the pre-2000 values. However, even a less but still conservative extrapolation would produce a 2016 AADT well above the assumption used in this TMP. In reality, such an AADT is unlikely to occur as this regional road will be totally gridlocked all peak periods.

A sensitivity study of the impact of background growth on future traffic flows, intersection performance and delays is essential if the capacity for the regional road system to provide the necessary infrastructure is to be assessed.


 

ACTION DUAP: Please explain why, based on the past AADT growth, such a ridiculously low background growth has been.assumed for this analysis. Also why does DUAP consider that this regional road network provides the infrastructure necessary to satisfy the SEPP 32 requirement of urban consolidation developments being placed near existing infrastructure when it is blatantly clear this road will be unusable unless a further crossing of Parramatta River is provided? What is the Government’s intentions and commitment to such a crossing?

 

 

 
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