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Paul Connett's speech on incineration and waste reduction
A presentation by
Dr. Paul Connett Professor of
Chemistry
St. Lawrence University
Canton, NY 13617.
At the 4th Annual International Management Conference
Waste-To-Energy
Nov. 24 & 25, 1998
Amsterdam.
About the author
Dr. Paul
Connett is a full and tenured professor of chemistry at St. Lawrence University
in Canton, New York, where he has taught for 15 years. He obtained his
undergraduate degree in natural sciences from Cambridge University and his Ph.D.
in chemistry from Dartmouth College in the US. For the past 14 years he has
researched waste management issues with a special emphasis on the dangers posed
by incineration and the safer and more sustainable non-burn alternatives.
He has attended
numerous international symposia on dioxin, and with his colleague Tom Webster
has presented six papers at these symposia which have been subsequently
published in Chemosphere. He has given over 1500 public presentations on these
issues in 48 states in the US and 40 other countries. With his wife Ellen he
edits the newsletter Waste
Not, which is in its twelfth year of publication. With Roger Bailey,
Professor of Fine Arts at St. Lawrence University, he has produced over 40
videotapes on waste management, dioxin and other environmental issues.
Executive Summary
Far from it being the universally proven technology claimed
by its promoters, the incineration of municipal trash with energy recovery has
been an experiment which after 20 years has left the citizens of industrialised
countries with a legacy of unacceptably high levels of dioxins and related
compounds in their food, their tissues, their babies and in wild life.
The author argues that as the industry has struggled to make incineration safe,
they have, like the nuclear power industry before them, priced themselves out of
the market. Moreover, as they have sought air pollution control devices to
capture the extremely toxic by-products of combustion, the resulting residues
have become more problematic and costly to handle, dispose and contain. There
are still remaining concerns about the safety of incinerators, especially as
they are built in developing economies, which do not have the resources to
build, operate or monitor them properly.
However, even if
these concerns are overcome, as we move into the twenty first century, the role of trash incineration, with or without energy recovery,
will become less and less viable, both economically and environmentally.
Our future task will be dominated by a need to find sustainable ways of living
on the planet. Those who have been preoccupied with making incineration safe
have lavished their engineering ingenuity on the wrong question. Society's task
is not to perfect the destruction of our waste, but to find ways to avoid making
it. The argument that burning waste can be used to recover energy makes for good
sales promotion, but the reality is that if saving energy is the goal, then more
energy can be saved by society as a whole by reusing and recycling objects and
materials than can be recovered by burning them. Municipal waste is a low-tech
problem. It is made by mixing. It is unmade by separation.
Both problem and
solution are at our fingertips, not on the drawing boards of Swiss or Swedish
engineers. In the longer term, after the citizen has played his or her part by
supporting source separation, reuse, recycling, composting and toxic removal,
industry has to pay more attention to the way objects and materials are made and
used. How an object is going to be reused or recycled has to be built into the
initial design decisions
To recognise that it
is overconsumption that is giving us both global warming and a waste disposal
crisis, is to recognise that trash is the most concrete connection each
individual has to the global crisis. More effort has to be put into resisting
the largely post-war American philosophy that "the more one consumes the happier
one becomes'", before it makes the planet uninhabitable. A way has to be found
to tame the voracious appetites of the multinational corporations which plunder
the world for short-term profit. This cannot be done until we as individuals
find a way to resist the skilful advertising that traps us within a whole web of
false needs. The antidote to overconsumption is community building. The fierce
local arguments that ensue over the siting of both landfills and incinerators
can be used to force these issues onto the political agenda.
Incineration might make sense if we had another planet to go to, but
without that sci-fi escape, it must be resisted in favour of more down-to-earth
solutions that we can live with, both within our local communities and on the
planet as a whole. Both incineration and raw waste landfilling attempt to bury
the evidence of an unacceptable throwaway lifestyle. Every incinerator built
delays this fundamental discussion by at least 20 years.
Introduction
As I deliver these
comments I am very conscious of the fact that many of the people sitting in this
audience earn their living from the operation of incinerators. They will
probably find many of my views antithetical to their own. I applaud the
organisers of this conference for having the courage to allow me to speak. Too
often, decision-makers do not discover the downside to incineration until the
wrath of the public is unleashed. To paraphrase the words of Shakespeare's
character Mark Anthony, I come here not to praise the idea of the incineration
of municipal waste with energy recovery, but to bury it. However, whether you
agree with my position or not, I hope you agree with Joseph Joubert, who said, "
'Tis better to debate a question without settling it, than to settle a question
without debating it". In my view, incineration of municipal waste looks back to
the nineteenth century, not forward to the twenty first. Indeed, the first
waste-to-energy plant was operating in Hamburg, Germany in 1895.
I will argue that
even if the finest engineers were able to make incineration safe - i.e. captured
all of the toxic emissions and found a safe method of handling and storing the
ash - from an ethical point of view, they would not have made the incineration
of trash acceptable. It simply doesn't make ethical sense to spend so much time,
money and effort destroying materials we should be sharing with the future.
Thus, those who have set themselves the Herculean task of perfecting the art and
science of incineration, have poured a massive amount of attention into the
wrong end of the problem and produced a sophisticated set of answers to the
wrong question. As we prepare to enter the twenty first century, society's task
is not find a new place or a new machine in which to put the trash, but to find
ways of not making waste in the first place.
When one first
hears about trash incineration it seems like a good idea. I certainly thought
so. It promised to rid our Northern NY county of 32 leaking landfills and to
produce energy as well. It seemed like a win-win situation. For a municipal
official beleaguered with the responsibility for a mountain of trash coming at
him or her on a daily basis it appears to offer a quick fix solution, with
little or no modification of the existing infrastructure for picking up trash.
For a politician with citizens yelling at him or her because they don't want to
live near a proposed landfill, or the expansion of an old one, the modern
waste-to-energy incinerator looks like a perfect political escape plan.
It is only when one
spends time looking below the surface appeal of these facilities that one
realises the huge backward step they represent, environmentally, socially,
economically and from the point of view of moving towards a sustainable society.
I will discuss the arguments against building more trash incinerators under
seven headings. They are:
1.
Toxic emissions
1.1
Hydrogen chloride is formed.
1.2
Nitric oxide is generated.
1.3
Toxic metals are released.
1.3.1
Mercury, a highly problematic pollutant, is difficult to control.
1.4
Dioxins, Furans and other by-products of combustion are formed.
1.4.1
Post combustion formation of dioxin.
1.4.2
The fly ash dioxin problem.
1.4.3
No continuous monitoring of dioxins possible.
1.4.4
Rising concern about current dioxin levels.
1.4.5
Dioxin emissions easily captured in food chains.
1.4.6
Ireland.
1.4.7
Advances in one country do not always translate to success in others.
1.5
End-of-the-pipe control
1.6
Modifications to counteract one pollutant can lead to increases in others.
1.6.1.
UK.
2.
Ash disposal.
2.1
Fly ash hazard often obscured.
2.2 Ash represents a Catch-22 for the incineration industry.
3.
Economic costs.
3.1.
Incinerators are formidably expensive.
3.2.
Very few jobs are created for this massive economic investment.
3.3
Most of the money invested in the incinerator leaves the community.
3.4
Loss of capital is acute in developing economies.
3.5
Taxpayers usually find out true costs when it is too late.
3.5.1
Flow control outlawed in the US.
4.
The waste of energy involved.
4.1.
Modern incinerators do produce saleable energy.
4.2 Reality versus Public relations.
4.2.1
Consider these simple points:
4.3
Recycling saves more energy than incineration yields.
4.4
A larger vision is needed.
5.
Public opposition.
5.1.
In the US incineration is the most unpopular technology since nuclear power.
5.2
US development at a standstill.
5.3
Opposition in other countries.
5.3.1
Germany.
5.3.2
France.
5.3.3 Bangladesh.
5.4
The dangers of ignoring public opinion.
5.5
Look at more than one option.
5.6
Even a true believer should not lead with incineration.
5.7
The non-burn alternatives are more popular.
6.
A few words on the alternatives.
6.1
Landfills.
6.2
The importance of composting.
6.3
Integrated waste management.
6.4
Five principles.
7.
Sustainability.
7.1
Cheap fossil fuels conceal our non-sustainability.
7.2
Incineration is a wasted opportunity.
7.3
Forces behind overconsumption.
7.4
Fighting the dominant paradigm.
7.5
Community building.
1. Toxic emissions
Introduction.
Let me acknowledge out the outset that the
incineration industry has made huge strides in reducing the emissions of toxic
substances since the 70's, 80's, and even the early '90s. However, this
improvement has not been uniform. For example, it is only recently that France
has been forced to take the dioxin problem seriously. The industry's task has
been very complicated, their solutions inevitably incomplete and most
importantly, not likely to be reproduced in countries where their regulatory
apparatus is less competent, or their budget is inadequate to pay for the
massive costs involved. Most chemists blink when they see
more than three chemicals in a test tube. The task set by a modern incinerator
is to burn all the substances society produces in one huge machine, as
well as tapping the energy liberated to generate heat and/or electricity
efficiently. In this extremely complicated process, a number of things occur.
1.1 Hydrogen chloride is formed.
Most of the chlorine in the waste stream is converted into hydrogen
chloride; a strong acid gas which at high temperatures will attack most metals
it meets. Most of the hydrogen chloride can be removed with alkaline scrubbing
devices before the flue gases leave the stack, but not necessarily before this
acid gas has damaged some of the materials from which the incinerator is built.
Furnace linings, ductwork and boiler tubes need frequent and costly attention.
1.2 Nitric oxide is generated.
At the high temperatures of combustion the nitrogen and oxygen in the air
combine to form nitric oxide (NO). Because this gas is neutral, it cannot be
removed by scrubbers using alkaline chemicals, such as lime. Systems involving
the injection of ammonia or urea can convert some of the nitric oxide back into
nitrogen, but these high-energy reagents are expensive (they are normally used
as fertilisers) and the removal of the nitric oxide is only about 60% effective.
Any nitric oxide that is not removed is later converted by sunlight into
nitrogen dioxide (NO2) which contributes to photochemical smog and acid rain.
1.3 Toxic metals are released.
At the temperatures of combustion many of the toxic metals such as lead,
cadmium, arsenic, mercury and chromium are liberated from otherwise fairly
stable matrices like plastics. Furthermore, they are liberated in the form of
tiny particles or gases, which, if they escape from the stack, vastly increase
the potential surface area of contact between themselves and the environment.
They also penetrate deep into human lungs, where they are rapidly exchanged with
the bloodstream.
The
traditional method of removing metals from emissions is via particulate control
devices such as electrostatic precipitators or baghouses (fabric filters). The
former, while being very robust, are less efficient at removing the tiniest
particles of concern. The latter are more efficient but suffer from breakage and
blockage and need careful maintenance.
1.3.1 Mercury, a highly problematic pollutant, is difficult to
control.
A particularly problematic metal has been mercury. At the
temperature of combustion it is a gas and evades the simple particulate control
discussed above. As a result trash incineration has been a major source of
mercury going into the environment. Many modern incinerators now employ
activated carbon to absorb the mercury. However, this is another expensive item,
and the public needs a way of knowing that the activated carbon is being used
continuously, because no trash incinerator, that I am aware
of, monitors toxic metal emissions on a continuous basis. Mercury removal
poses several further questions.
What is the fate of
the mercury captured on the activated carbon or the fly ash residues? Is the
spent charcoal sent for reactivation, if so where does the mercury go? Is the
spent charcoal burned in the incinerator, in which case where does the mercury
go, as it can't stay in the incinerator forever? How does the presence of
activated carbon effect the leaching and other characteristics of ash disposed
of in landfills? In hot climates will the mercury evaporate from the ash?
1.4 Dioxins, Furans and
other by-products of combustion are formed.
Shortly after the
infamous accident in Seveso,
Italy, (1976) which made the chemical 2,3,7,8-Tetra Chlorinated
Dibenzo-para-Dioxin (2,3,7,8-TCDD or the singular "dioxin"), into a household
word, Kees Olie and co-workers in the Netherlands identified this same substance
in the emissions from trash incinerators. They, and subsequent workers, also
found many other members of the dioxin family (there are 75 poly chlorinated
dibenzo para dioxins, or PCDDs) and members of the furan family (there are 135
poly chlorinated dibenzo furans, or PCDFs) in these emissions. The major response to this discovery from consultants representing
the incinerator industry was to claim that as long as the incinerator furnace
was operated at a high temperature all the dioxins and furans would be
destroyed, however these claims were subsequently found to be based on
fraudulent manipulation of the data.
1.4.1 Post combustion formation of
dioxin.
In 1985, the reason why high temperatures alone could not
solve the dioxin problem was revealed at the International Symposium on Dioxin
held in Bayreuth, Germany. Two groups showed that dioxins could be reformed
after the flue gases left the combustion chamber. It is now
well established that if the flue gases from an incinerator are passed through
air pollution control devices operating at temperatures in the range 200-400
degrees Celsius, more than a hundred fold increase in dioxin and furan formation
can take place. A strategy that would essentially minimise post
combustion formation of dioxin would require the quenching of the flue gases
immediately after they emerge from the combustion chamber. However, this
strategy conflicts with the aim of generating electricity, because this requires
the flue gases to go through boilers to generate steam to drive turbines, thus
delaying the moment when flue gas quenching occurs.
1.4.2 The fly ash dioxin problem.
Without the immediate quenching system, the fly ash collected in the
scrubbing devices will be contaminated with dioxins and furans.
While some
commentators have argued that modern incinerators are net destroyers of dioxins
and furans this argument does not hold if more appropriate dioxin levels
in the incoming waste are assumed and if the dioxins in the fly ash and the
bottom ash are included. A hundred times more dioxin may
leave the facility on the fly ash, than from the air emissions. However,
until recently, regulatory agencies, particularly the US EPA, have turned a
blind eye to the dioxins and furans left on the fly ash, even though in some
cases the combined ash (a combination of bottom ash and fly ash) is being used
as daily cover in some US landfills. In stark contrast, in Japan, as a result of
growing concern about the dioxin problem there, the government announced in 1997
that they were limiting the total dioxin emissions (i.e. air emissions plus fly
ash plus bottom ash) to 5 micrograms of dioxin International Toxic Equivalents
(I-TEQ) per metric ton of trash burned. According to presentations made at
Dioxin '97 in Indianapolis, this will almost certainly require the fly ash from
Japanese incinerators to be vitrified, which will still further escalate the
costs of incineration.
1.4.3 No continuous
monitoring of dioxins possible.
Even when the
most stringent precautions are taken to minimise dioxin air emissions it is
still very difficult to convince the public that the emissions are low because
there is no equipment available in the world capable of monitoring dioxins and
furans on a continuous basis. Instead, we have to rely on measurements
made on a spot-check basis, with advance notice given to the operator that they
are going to be monitored on a particular day. It is very rare for this to occur
more than once a year. Indeed, until recently, very few incinerators in the US
had been measured more than once in their whole operating lifetime.
Thus, even with the best designed incinerators, the public is still
hostage to how well they are operated, maintained and monitored over
their lifetime of 20 years or more. The potential problems are well illustrated
by the Indianapolis incinerator. This modern facility went on line in late 1988.
Through tenacious sleuthing by a local environmental group, it emerged that this
facility violated its permit limits over 6000 times, including by-passing its
air pollution control devices 18 times, in the first two years of operation. In
addition, the incinerator had 27 boiler tube failures within one year.
No one knows what the
dioxin emissions were like when these events took place. In short, in most
countries neither the regulatory authorities nor the industry has been able to
put the monitoring of dioxin from these facilities onto a truly scientific
foundation. The matter threatens to get worse as these incinerators get built in
Southern and former Eastern European countries, where current regulatory control
abilities are already low and where they have no facilities to monitor dioxin
even on a spot-check basis.
1.4.4 Rising concern about
current dioxin levels.
Dioxin emissions have to be put against the
backdrop of an increasing public concern about background dioxin levels in the
environment, in our food and in our tissues.
Of particular
concern, is the fact that the highest doses of these potent endocrine-disrupting
chemicals are reaching us from our food and being delivered to the unborn
foetus. While industry spokespersons frequently argue that dioxin emissions are
extremely low (especially when compared to conventional pollutants), the counter
argument is to note that dioxins interfere with several
hormonal systems, in which the hormones function in human tissues at part per
trillion levels. A critical finding occurred in 1992, when Dutch
scientists discovered that even at background exposures dioxin was capable of
interfering with the thyroid metabolism of babies at one week of age.
1.4.5
Dioxin emissions easily captured in food chains.
Any dioxin released
from an incinerator, be it in large quantities from badly operated facilities,
or smaller quantities from better run ones, is readily captured by grazing
animals and fish. In 1986, Tom Webster and I calculated that one litre of milk
would deliver as much dioxins as a human would get breathing the air next to the
cow for eight months.
More recent calculations indicate that in one day a grazing cow puts as much
dioxin into its body (from dioxin which has deposited on the grass), as a human
being would get if he or she breathed the air next to the cow for fourteen
years. This is not just an academic affair. In 1989, 16 dairy farmers downwind
of a huge incinerator in Rotterdam, were told not to sell their milk, because it
contained three times higher dioxin levels than anywhere else in the
Netherlands.
This
situation continued until 1995 by which time the incinerator had been
retrofitted. Nor was this concern put to rest in 1995. In January of this year
(1998) three incinerators were shut down in the Lisle area of France, because
local milk produced downwind of these facilities had been contaminated with
dioxin to levels three times higher than the permitted sale level (5 parts per
trillion TEQ in the milk fat).
1.4.6 Ireland.
Ireland provides an indicator of how
large the legacy of dioxin pollution from incinerators has been. A little
publicised report from Ireland indicates just how extensive the contamination of
the European milk supply from dioxin has been. Dr. Christopher Rappe analysed 32
cows' milk samples from different parts of Ireland.
The reported levels
ranged from 0.12 to 0.51 ppt. (parts per trillion) of dioxin I-TEQs in the milk
fat, with an average of 0.23 ppt. These levels are much lower than the levels
reported in Switzerland, Germany, Holland, France and the UK. In my view it is
significant that Ireland has no trash incinerators.
1.4.7 Advances in one
country do not always translate to success in others.
Again and
again, optimistic reports about how well one particular country, or one
particular incinerator, has done with limiting dioxin emissions, has been used
to promote the building of incinerators in other countries, where the operators
are neither as conscientious nor the regulators as competent.
For example, long
after Swedish consultants and scientists had told the world that Sweden had
solved the dioxin emission problem (about 1986), incinerators were built and
operated in the US which had extremely high dioxin emissions.
For example a 2000
ton per day trash incinerator built in Norfolk, Virginia in 1988, was found in
1994, to be putting out more dioxin (approximately 2000 grams of toxic
equivalents per year) than the combined emissions from all of the traffic,
incinerators, industry and all other sources in Sweden, Germany and the
Netherlands added together.
1.5 End-of-the-pipe control
The attention being
paid to end-of-the-pipe dioxin control on incinerators will not solve the dioxin
contamination of the environment. Whether one accepts the need for trash
incineration or not, one has to applaud the efforts and success of those who
have reduced dioxin emissions from these facilities. However, this effort cannot
solve the dioxin problem generated by municipal waste. As long as chlorinated
plastics like poly vinyl chloride (PVC) and poly vinylidine dichloride (PVDC)
are present in the waste stream, dioxins and furans are going to be generated in
every back yard burner, landfill fire, roadside burning and accidental fires in
homes, businesses and industry.
The reduction of
dioxin emissions in northern incinerators should not make us complacent about
the potential dioxin contamination from the building of inferior quality
incinerators in southern countries and the continued contamination from the
casual and accidental burning of trash in both north and south. In my view, the
dioxin problem can only be solved by phasing out the use of chlorinated plastics
and the industrial use of chlorine.
1.6 Modifications to
counteract one pollutant can lead to increases in others.
The incineration industry has had to develop on the fly.
New scientific and environmental findings trigger new pollution control devices
and expensive retrofits. Incinerators are built and financed with the
expectation that they will operate at least 20 years. However, incinerators
operating today look very different from those built 20 years ago. We can
anticipate that those operating 20 years from now will look very different from
today's.
The trouble with making changes on the fly, is
that a solution to one pollutant problem, may make other pollutant problems
worse.
For
example, the demand for higher furnace temperatures and better combustion to
combat the dioxin problem, led to higher nitric oxide formation, the greater
liberation of toxic metals, and reduced mercury control (less soot available for
mercury absorption). Both the desire to capture energy via water boilers and the
use of electrostatic precipitators for particulate control, increased the post
combustion formation of dioxin. The use of lime and baghouse scrubbing
combinations has led to a more toxic fly ash product. The public has had to live
through this ongoing experiment for many years, and continues to do so.
For example, in 1993,
the citizens of Columbus, Ohio, who were aroused by
anecdotal reports of an increase in rare neurological symptoms and other
illnesses, including cancer, in the vicinity of a 2000 ton per day
incinerator, discovered that measurements made at the facility in 1992,
but not reported to the public, indicated that nearly 1000 grams of dioxin TEQs
were being emitted from the facility annually. This was more than the total
dioxin generated in the whole of Germany at that time. The citizens received two
further shocks. First, scientists from the US EPA reported at Dioxin '93, that
the total quantity of dioxin emitted from all the US trash incinerators combined
(about 130 at that time) was between 60 and 200 grams of dioxin TEQs (24), which
was less than the single Columbus incinerator by itself. Second, the Ohio Health department reported that a 1000 grams of dioxin
(about one half of a Seveso accident) falling annually on their heads and
surrounding areas posed no health problems.
1.6.1.UK.
In the UK, officials have had
to admit that their trash incinerators operating in the '70s, '80s and even into
the early '90s, could not meet new European dioxin standards without major
retrofits, and that these "old" incinerators had been responsible for putting
most of the dioxin into the UK environment, including cows' milk. We have
already noted that both the range and the average dioxin level in cows' milk in
the UK (i.e. background levels) is much higher than the truer "background"
levels in Ireland. Instead of issuing a massive apology for permitting this
pollution of the food supply, the UK is currently proposing to build more
incinerators as part of their "alternative" energy program.
2. Ash Disposal
Introduction.
There are two kinds of ash generated by an
incinerator: the bottom ash which falls through the grate system in the furnace
(about 90% of the ash), and the fly ash, which is the very fine material which
is collected in the boilers, the heat exchangers and the air pollution control
devices. As far as toxic metals are concerned, it is a
chemical truism to state that the better the air pollution control the more
toxic the fly ash becomes
2.1 Fly ash hazard often
obscured.
In some jurisdictions like Ontario, Canada and Germany,
the fly ash is assumed to be a highly toxic material and is automatically sent
to hazardous waste containment facilities. In Japan, current regulations will
probably force the vitrification of the fly ash. However, in other jurisdictions
the toxicity of the fly ash (particularly) is obscured by three things: a) the
mixing of the fly ash with the bottom ash before testing and disposal, b) not
testing for the absolute levels of toxics like metals and dioxins in the ash,
but rather only looking at what dissolves out of the ash during a leachate test
and c) the interference of the lime present in the ash with some of these
leaching tests. All three of these machinations particularly
pertain in the US. Because of this situation, in my view, neither workers nor
members of the public have been fully warned of the dangers of being directly
exposed to this ash.
Further, in some
jurisdictions the ash is being handled and disposed of in a cavalier fashion,
which while it may save the operators money, is highly unsatisfactory from an
environmental point of view. For example, in the Netherlands, as of 1994, 35% of
the fly ash was going into asphalt. In the US combined ash has gone directly to
municipal landfills and mixed with trash containing organic material. In many
instances it is used for landfill cover. Elsewhere, the fly ash has been used to
make concrete, with no warning on the product label that it contains toxic
metals or dioxins.
2.2 Ash
represents a Catch-22 for the incineration industry.
If handled properly, ash makes incineration prohibitively
expensive, for all but the wealthiest communities. If handled improperly, it
poses both short and long term health and environmental dangers.
3. Economic costs
3.1. Incinerators are
formidably expensive.
At the time the small incinerator proposal
(200 tons per day) was defeated in our county in Northern NY (St. Lawrence
County), in 1990, the capital costs had risen to $34 million. The investment
firm Moodys had estimated that the tipping fee (the cost to consumers of
delivering one ton of trash to the facility) would be a staggering $180 per ton.
Such tipping fees have essentially eliminated facilities in the US much smaller
than 750 tons per day. In 1983, a 1500 ton per day facility built in North
Andover, with only a three field electrostatic precipitator for air pollution
control, cost about $190 million.
The current tipping
fee is $95 per ton, but could rise as high as $200 per ton in order to pay for
new air pollution control. A 1000 ton per day facility which went on line in
1994 in Syracuse, NY, and fitted with state-of- the-art air pollution control,
cost $178 million. A 2000 ton per day facility, which went on line near
Amsterdam in the Netherlands in 1995, cost a massive $600 million with half the
investment going into air pollution control. Tipping fees reported from some
German incinerators are staggering.
3.2. Very
few jobs are created for this massive economic investment.
Most of
the money spent on these incinerators is going into complicated equipment. Apart
from the number of jobs created in the building of the plant, very few permanent
jobs are forthcoming. A large incinerator may employ about 100 workers. On the
other hand, if the community puts its efforts into source separation, reuse and
repair, recycling and composting, a very large number of jobs are created, both
in the actual handling of the waste and in the secondary industries which
utilise the recovered material.
3.3 Most of
the money invested in the incinerator leaves the community.
The huge
engineering firms that build incinerators are seldom located in the host
community and thus most of the money invested leaves the community (and the
country if the company is foreign based). On the other hand, money invested in
the low tech alternatives stays in the community creating local jobs and
stimulating other forms of community development.
3.4 Loss of capital
is acute in developing economies.
Developing economies, can ill
afford to lose capital and local job opportunities. In 1997, authorities in the
Philippines were considering three large trash incinerators for the Manila area
(and as many as 7 others outside Manila). The Danish company Volund is offering
to build a 1300 ton per day facility at the old, and infamous, Smoky Mountain
dump, to burn excavated plastics from the old landfill there.
The American company,
Ogden Martin is being considered to build a 2000 ton per day facility at the
Carmona landfill, just outside Manila, and the Swiss Swedish conglomerate Asea
Brown and Boveri (ABB) is part of a proposal to build a 4500 ton per day
facility (which would be the largest in the world) at the San Mateo landfill.
It is extremely
frustrating to witness the potential squandering of huge amounts of taxpayers'
money on these capital intensive facilities, while the largely voluntary and
local efforts to develop recycling and composting programs in the Barangays
(small political jurisdictions within the city) wither for lack of financial and
governmental support. These truths are often concealed from taxpayers, because
the incinerator projects are frequently promoted as being "privately financed".
This coupled with the PR hype of "waste-to-energy" tricks many into believing
that the public will not be paying for these facilities, when in fact, apart
from a relatively minor return from energy sales (discussed below) the bulk of
the repayment on the investment (plus profits) has to come from the tipping fee
which comes out of the public exchequer.
3.5 Taxpayers
usually find out true costs when it is too late.
In order to pay
back the massive investment involved in building an incinerator, the builder
usually has to secure contracts which commit communities to deliver their trash
to the facility for an extended period of time. The latter have to sign a
so-called "put-or-pay" agreement.
These commit the
communities to deliver a prescribed amount of trash to the incinerator each
month or year, at a fixed rate, and should they fail to do so they have to pay
the scheduled amount anyway.
3.5.1 Flow control outlawed
in the US.
In the US, the Supreme Court threw a monkey wrench into
this system when it ruled that these kind of "flow control" measures as applied
to waste haulers were unconstitutional, claiming that they interfered with
"inter-state commerce". In short, waste haulers are now allowed to take the
waste where they choose. This means that in many states, trash haulers are
taking the waste to distant landfills where the tipping fee is much cheaper.
For example, in 1998,
the spot market price for getting rid of trash in Massachusetts is about $45 a
ton, which means that facilities like the North Andover incinerator, charging
$95 a ton tipping fee, are in serious financial trouble. In New Jersey,
political leaders are in a turmoil trying to work out how to finance the
remaining $1.6 billion debt on the five incinerators that have been built there
(at one point NJ wanted to build 22 incinerators!) (29). Again, each incinerator
is not receiving the amount of waste (and hence income) anticipated.
The current debate is
over who should pay off these debts: the county operating the incinerator, the
counties using the incinerator or the state as a whole.
4. Incineration is a waste
of energy
4.1. Modern
incinerators do produce saleable energy.
The modern trash
incinerator can be used to generate hot water, steam and/or electricity. Trash
in industrialised countries contains enough paper and plastic for it to burn
without the need of any (or much) auxiliary fuel. As few communities recover
energy from the waste dumped into landfills, this energy recovery represents a
net energy gain to the local community.
Long term contracts
for the sale of steam to local companies, or state facilities, like prisons, can
sometimes be secured or the sale of electricity to power utilities can be
negotiated. In some cases state or national governments require the utilities to
purchase the energy from incinerators. In the UK, the government even offers
subsidies to trash incineration under its Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO)
incentive scheme to promote alternatives to fossil fuels for power generation.
4.2 Reality versus Public
relations.
While, the claim that the modern trash incinerator is a
"waste-to-energy" facility makes for good public relations, the reality is that
they produce very little energy and energy production certainly doesn't justify
the huge costs involved in building them. For example, the 1500 ton per day
facility built in North Andover (Massachusetts) at a cost of $190 million,
receives trash from about half a million people, but only provides enough
electricity to power 28,000 homes.
All of Japan's 193
waste-to-energy incinerators combined produce less energy than one nuclear power
station and if the United States burned all its municipal waste it would
contribute less than 1% of the country's energy needs.
4.2.1 Consider these simple
points:
1) A trash incinerator is the only kind
of power station which gets paid to accept the fuel it burns.
2) The
costs of generating electricity increases significantly, as the fuel gets
dirtier and trash is the dirtiest fuel burned in any "power station". Enormous
amounts of money have to go into air pollution control and ash disposal, if
these are done properly.
3) A trash incinerator has to run for several years
before there is a net production of energy. Large quantities of energy have to
go into building; operating, maintaining and dismantling it after its life is
over.
4) The economics of paying for the building and running of an
incinerator revolve around the tipping fee paid by communities to use the
facility. The income from electricity sales is a minor contributor. For example
a facility I visited in Poggibonzi, Italy, in 1998, was receiving 10 times more
money from tipping fees than they were obtaining from the sale of electricity.
4.3
Recycling saves more energy than incineration yields.
The most
telling argument against the waste-to-energy promotion comes from two studies
performed in the US which show that if the currently marketable recyclable
material, which is typically burned in a modern trash incinerator, was recycled
instead, some 3-5 times as much energy would be saved compared to that produced
from it being burned. The reason for this big difference is that incineration
can only recover the some of the calorific value contained in the trash. It
cannot recover any of the energy invested in the extraction, processing,
fabrication and chemical synthesis involved in the manufacture of the objects
and materials in the waste stream. Reuse and recycling can.
4.4 A larger vision is needed.
From a national or global perspective, an incinerator is a "waste-of-energy"
facility not a "waste-to-energy" facility. Unfortunately, this is often lost on
the local decision-maker, who sees a net local production of energy compared to
land filling.
A
larger vision is needed to see the loss of energy that incineration represents.
Simply put, every time a local community burns something the larger community
has to replace it with all the huge energy costs of primary processing and
fabrication. It is only reuse; recycling and composting that allows us to
partially reduce the energy (and pollution) costs of primary processing and
fabrication.
5. Public Opposition
5.1. In the
US incineration is the most unpopular technology since nuclear power.
Since 1985, in the US, over 300 trash incinerators, have
been defeated or put on hold.
In 1985, California had plans for 35
incinerators, only 3 were built, the rest were cancelled. In 1985, New Jersey
had plans for 22 trash incinerators, only 5 have been built. A sixth planned for
Mercer County was finally defeated after many years of struggle, in November
1996. Since 1994, more incinerators have been closed down than those that have
gone on line.
5.2 US development
at a standstill.
As of this writing (October
1998) there is not one active proposal to build a trash incinerator of any
significant size (i.e. above 40 tons per day) in the US. The last
proposal considered was one by Foster Wheeler in the town of Pennsville, NJ. Not
only did the County Commissioners reject this proposal, but Foster Wheeler has
announced since this defeat and a humiliating debacle with the fluidised bed
incinerator which it built in Robbins, Illinois, that it is getting out of the
Waste- to-energy incineration business in the US (35).
Several other large engineering firms have pulled out of the incinerator
business in the US, including Combustion Engineering, Blount, Dravo,
Westinghouse, General Electric and Ebasco.
This leaves only
three major players: Ogden Martin, Wheelabrator and American Refuel. Two of
these are owned by major waste companies (WMI and BFI) which can cover their
loss on the incinerator front with developments in other areas of their waste
business.
5.3 Opposition in
other countries.
It isn't just the US where incineration has proved
so unpopular. There has been strong opposition to new
incinerator proposals in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, the UK and many other
countries, both in the North and in the South. There is not enough time to go
into much detail here, but three countries provide particularly interesting
examples.
5.3.1 Germany.
Germany is considered by many to build, operate and regulate their
incinerators better than any other country, and yet the opposition to the
building of new incinerators there since the late '80s has been intense. For
example, a citizens' coalition called "Das Bessere Mullkoncept"(the Better
Garbage Concept) in 1990, was able to get a referendum on the ballot in Bavaria
which would have virtually eliminated trash incineration as a waste option. At
that time the Bavarian government was planning 17 new incinerators.
The coalition was
able to get over one million people to go to their town halls, in a 12 day
period, to sign a lengthy petition in support of getting this referendum on the
ballot. Even though the referendum was narrowly defeated, this was an amazing
achievement and an indication of the massive unpopularity of incineration in
this state.
5.3.2 France.
Many
of us in the environmental movement had given up on France as far as challenging
incineration was concerned. Any country that can go half way around the globe
and explode atomic bombs in someone else's backyard is hardly amenable to
environmental or ethical arguments.
However, in the last few years a grass roots movement against incineration has
emerged in France which is second to none. The National Coalition Against the
Importation, Exportation and Incineration of Waste, has over 100 communities as
members, has already stopped several incinerators, and has generated more press
coverage on dioxin and the contamination of the food chain than any other
country in the world.
5.3.3
Bangladesh.
When citizens in Khulna (a port in the Bay of Bengal)
heard about a proposal by an American company to build a power station in their
town, they were excited. When however, the Bangladesh Environmental Law
Association investigated the matter, they found that the actual proposal was a
huge trash incineration plant which would burn trash shipped in from New York
City. They were far from impressed and organised, successfully, to stop the
project. So, even in countries, which are economically depressed, citizens are
capable of seeing through the "waste-to-energy" promotion hype, if there is some
individual or group prepared to do some homework.
5.4 The dangers of ignoring
public opinion.
Too often decision-makers make the decision to build
an incinerator before they have consulted with the public in a meaningful way.
They usually rely on large consulting companies to review their options. Because
such companies draw much of their expertise from an engineering background, they
have a natural tendency towards the high-tech solution and give little credence
to solutions in which organisation and education must play a dominant role.
PR firms are used to devise strategies which attempt to
negate the public's "irritating" opposition. However, treating the public
in this way usually proves disastrous. What is billed, as a "quick-fix" solution
isn't quick, if the public organises to oppose it?
5.5 Look at more than one
option.
Even if decision-makers believe that incineration will be a
part of their waste solution, they would be advised to put serious attention and
equal funding (with a careful choice of consultants) into an alternative plan
that doesn't include incineration. This way they can avoid the trap of coming to
the public with a proposal which essentially says, "accept our incinerator or
opt for chaos".
5.6 Even a true
believer should not lead with incineration.
Politically it does not
make sense to lead with the most problematic, most expensive and most
contentious alternative to landfilling. It makes more sense to lead with those
alternatives which are least contentious, namely reuse, recycling and
composting. Only when these have been maximised, should incinerators or other
destructive technologies be considered.
5.7 The non-burn
alternatives are more popular.
In sharp contrast to incineration,
recycling and composting are far more popular with the general public. In the
US, more people recycle than vote! Despite pessimistic predictions by waste
experts in the mid- '80s, the American people have emphatically embraced
recycling. Currently, there are nearly 9000 curbside recycling programs, and
over 3000 yard waste composting programs in operation in the US (37).
Seattle, a city of
one million people is close to a 50% diversion from landfill. The state of NJ,
as a whole, has achieved a 45% diversion rate, with some individual communities
exceeding 60%. Communities in the Quinte region of Ontario, Canada have achieved
over 70% diversion from landfill. Small communities near Milan, Italy have also
achieved diversion rates of over 70%, and two communities near Padua are at 80%
and above.
6. A few words about
alternatives
This presentation is already far too long for me to
spend much time discussing the details of non-burn alternatives. There are,
however, a few points that can be made which throw more light on the
incineration debate.
6.1
Landfills.
It is clear that no solution to waste will get rid of
landfills, at least for the foreseeable future. The question then becomes what
kind of landfill can your community live with. A raw waste landfill? A landfill
that receives the ash, bulky waste and other material by-passed from the
incinerator? A residue landfill after an intensive source separation, reduction,
reuse, recycling, toxic removal and composting program? Put like that, most
people would probably opt for third option, assuming that they had confidence in
the quality of the program.
But we can make such a landfill even better, if
we insist that it be preceded by a screening facility to ensure that only
non-toxic and non-biodegradable material is buried.
Unfortunately, such a
"front end" approach seems to be out of step with most regulatory authorities
which endorse a "back end" approach. Their approach consists of lining systems,
leachate collection, leachate treatment, daily cover, final cover and capping as
the way of protecting the environment from dumping things into a hole in the
ground. Because of the economy of scale, this approach of "controlling what
comes out" tends to drive the building of regional mega- landfills. These excite
intense opposition from host communities, and usually have to be pushed through
undemocratically. The alternative approach of "controlling what goes in", means
that we can return to small, more politically acceptable, community controlled
landfills.
6.2 The importance of
composting.
While most people often describe the alternative to
landfilling and incineration as "recycling", in my view, the most important
component of the alternative strategy, after the critical first step of source
separation (discussed below), is "composting". This is because the material
which causes most of the problems in landfills is organic (biodegradable) waste.
This otherwise relatively benign material once it gets into a landfill creates
methane, which contributes to global warming, doors, and an acid leachate, which
in turn can move toxins into the surface or ground water. Composting, at a far
lower environmental and economic cost than incineration, can keep this organic
material out of landfills.
6.3
Integrated waste management.
Undoubtedly, one of the responses to
this presentation from incinerator advocates will be, "We agree with you about
the necessity to maximise reduction, reuse and recycling (they often forget to
include composting on this list), but you are still going to have some stuff
left over, doesn't it make sense to burn this material and recover its energy
content rather than to dump it in a landfill?" This argument goes by the name
"integrated waste management". It sounds good, but it seldom yields what it
promises.
Once a
community embarks on building an incinerator, it soaks up all the available
cash; little is left over for a really aggressive recycling and composting
program. Moreover, once the incinerator is built it will need all the waste it
can get (which in the US often includes non-municipal waste) in order to pay off
the massive loans needed to build it. In essence, once built you have to
maximise the use of an incinerator. It is inflexible: other new options will be
resisted.
On the
other hand, if one backs up the reuse, recycling and composting program with an
expensive landfill (or the temporary export of waste to a distant landfill) one
can minimise its use without penalty. Ideally, decision makers should strive to
design a program where increased waste reduction, reuse, recycling and
composting, visibly saves the community money from avoided landfill tipping
fees. In this way one will have "integrated" the environmental solution with the
economic solution.
6.4 Five principles.
Left to highly paid consulting firms, municipal waste can become an
extremely complicated business. Certainly, incineration done
properly is a very complicated process. However, if we look at the
"waste" in our homes it is a relatively simple material. In essence, its most of
the material we paid good money for yesterday and we don't want today. Waste is
made by mixing all this material together. It can be unmade with source
separation. This is the vital first step in solving the waste crisis.
With source
separation we can get reusable objects, materials that can be recycled back to
industry, materials that can be composted (preferably in our backyards), some
household toxins and an educated household. With manufacturers, and especially
the packaging industry, producing ever more complicated mixtures of materials,
some objects once separated still pose problems. However, rather than allowing
these poorly designed materials drive the building of expensive incinerators,
these "left over" materials should drive research into better industrial design.
In my view, the five principles, or imperatives, we need to apply in order to
solve the waste crisis in an environmentally sound and economically cost
effective manner, are:
1. Keep the solution simple.
2. Keep the solution
local.
3. Integrate the solution with the local economy.
4. Integrate
the solution with local community development.
5. Make sure the solution is
sustainable.
7. Sustainability
7.1 Cheap fossil fuels
conceal our non-sustainability.
I argue that the fragile biosphere
of our planet is threatened because the industrialised nations have imposed, at
an ever-increasing pace, a linear system of handling materials, onto a
biological system which handles materials in a circular fashion. Our linear
approach is not sustainable on a finite planet. However, its non-sustainability
has been hidden from us for over 200 years by an apparent "abundant" supply of
fossil fuel. The end result is the conversion of material resources to waste, at
an ever-increasing rate.
Even world famous
economists have rationalised a system which lives off capital rather than
income. The use of incineration fails to challenge this linear system.
7.2 Incineration is a wasted
opportunity.
Every time we burn something in an incinerator, or dump
it in a landfill, we have to replace it. This means going back to all the high
energy inputs, resource depletion and pollution of primary processing. It is
precisely the enormous growth in primary processing that is giving us global
warming.
In other
words, it is overconsumption that is giving us both the local trash crises and
the global crisis. It is only by reusing, recycling and reducing consumption
that we can do anything about either. The trash bag or can is the most concrete
connection each individual has with the global crisis.
7.3 Forces behind overconsumption.
At the national level the fires of overconsumption are further stoked by
economies which measure their success in the global economy by their annual
growth of their GNP and not the welfare of their citizens or the quality of the
environment which they plunder. By and large, the individual has been seduced
with an elaborate web of false needs woven by a very sophisticated advertising
industry, harboured by an equally alluring and distracting host medium called
television.
7.4 Fighting the
dominant paradigm.
As long as the prevailing western (largely post-
war American) philosophy - the more we consume the happier we will become -
threatens to rule the world, as a species we are doomed. Our salvation rests on
those who can show that they have become happier while consuming far less. As
Gandhi so elegantly put it, "the world has enough for every one's need but not
enough for every one's greed."
7.5
Community building.
We need to find the strength to put human
relations and community building at the centre of our lives, instead of the TV
set. Educating our citizens to reduce, reuse, recycle and compost is not a total
solution but it is a fine beginning. On the other hand, every trash incinerator
built delays this discussion and squanders the opportunity to move our
communities and our species in the right direction to fight overconsumption and
the global warming it spawns.
8. Conclusion
In the above presentation I have presented the arguments which support my
conclusion that incineration is not an appropriate waste management solution in
the twenty first century. Fortunately, the public's fears
about the pollutants released and those captured in the residues, as well as
incineration's enormous economic costs, when made visible, have dramatically
slowed down the building of these facilities in both northern and southern
countries alike. If one avoids the beguiling but inaccurate label
"waste-to-energy" one can see that these facilities do not belong in a future in
which sustainability will become the key issue for survival. In my view, when
you build an incinerator in your community you are advertising to the world that
you were not clever enough, either politically or technically, to recover your
discarded resources in a manner which is responsible to your local community or
future generations.
Home Page of J Coleman on whose site this work originally appeared